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Nadia Delicata1
Amoris Laetitia and Veritatis Splendor  
on the “Object of the Act”
On taking up a text, it is good to remind ourselves that our reading of this 
encyclical must be a real dialogue in which both reader and document have a 
part. A minimum of openness and good will is indispensable if we are to welcome 
and grasp any writer’s thought, discover his message, and draw profit from it. The 
suggestion of the apostle St. James is also relevant: “Be quick to listen and slow 
to speak.” In other words, we first have to read it attentively, a little as if we were 
listening to a friend. We need to take time out too, for reflection, to make sure we 
really hear what it is saying. Then we shall be able to make an informed judgment 
and perhaps later some pertinent comments.
Given the rich fruits of the two-year Synod process, this Exhortation will treat, 
in different ways, a wide variety of questions. This explains its inevitable length. 
Consequently, I do not recommend a rushed reading of the text. The greatest 
benefit, for families themselves and for those engaged in the family apostolate, 
will come if each part is read patiently and carefully, or if attention is paid to the 
parts dealing with their specific needs. 
I introduce the article with these two quotes, both referring to documents of the Magisterium, to make a simple observation. While they were written 
twenty years apart, the two authors are making exactly the same point. In fact, 
one would be justified in thinking that they might be considering exactly the 
same document. Or at least, that if the texts they were referring to were different, 
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they might still be raising similar, or related challenges to demand the same level 
of attentiveness and preparedness from the reader. 
Yet it might come as a surprise that the two quotes refer to two Magisterial 
documents that some in the Roman Catholic Church today want to present as 
opposed to each another. If the second quote is from the introduction to the 
Apostolic Exhortation Amoris laetitia (AL 7),2 where Pope Francis himself is 
urging attentive pondering, the first text is authored by the Dominican Servais 
Pinckaers,3 who as Craig Steven Titus notes, “was intimately involved in shaping 
the encyclical Veritatis splendor (VS) and [the moral theology section of ] the 
Catechism,”4 and, of course, is referring to none other than the famous encyclical. 
The Catechism and VS,5 both foremost doctrinal works of St. John Paul II’s 
papacy, were “drawn up at the same time” and in part, for the same purpose 
of the renewal of moral theology called for by the Second Vatican Council. 
Thus, it is necessary “to observe the correspondence” since, if the Catechism “is 
set in a broader perspective and has the more general purpose of providing an 
overall, well-ordered teaching on morality as related to the Creed, sacraments 
and prayer,” “the encyclical is more limited in its object, since its focus is limited 
to certain basic questions and theories which are open to criticism in view of 
Catholic tradition.”6 
In fact, in the quote above, in his usual gracious style, Pinckaers is referring to 
the very-heated controversy in the wake of VS between self-styled “traditionalists” 
 2 Pope Francis, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Amoris Lætitia, March 19, 2016, 
http://m.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-
francesco_esortazione-ap_20160319_amoris-laetitia_en.pdf. 
 3 Servais Pinckaers, “An Encyclical for the Future: Veritatis splendor,” in Veritatis Splendor and 
the Renewal of Moral Theology: Studies by Ten Outstanding Scholars, eds., J. A. DiNoia and R. 
Cessario (Princeton, NJ: Scepter Publications, 1999), 11.
 4 Craig Steven Titus, “Servais Pinckaers and the Renewal of Catholic Moral Theology,” 
Journal of Moral Theology 1/1 (2012): 57. Titus notes that at the time, Christoph Cardinal 
Schönborn, O.P., a former student and longtime friend of Pope Benedict XVI, but also the one 
chosen by Pope Francis to lead the press conference that presented the Apostolic Exhortation 
Amoris Laetitia, was Professor of Dogmatic Theology at the University of Fribourg, and therefore 
a colleague of Pinckaers’, but also the Secretary of the commission responsible for drafting the 
Catechism. “It cannot be doubted that the proximity of the two professors and the respect for 
Pinckaers’ works both inside the Church and at large (as is evident in his being invited to join the 
International Theological Commission in 1990 and his growing international influence) were 
instrumental in allying Pinckaers to these projects of the Magisterium.” (p. 58, n.74). 
 5 Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, August 6, 1993, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-
paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor.html#-3K. 
 6 Pinckaers, “An Encyclical for the Future,” 16-17.
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and “revisionists.” In a long essay, where he gives a detailed explanation of the 
text and argues why VS is “an encyclical for the future,” he begs fellow moral 
theologians, not only “to perceive what is at stake in the questions [it] raises 
and the significance of the answers it proposes,” but more crucially, and in line 
with his lifelong work of recovering “Thomism” as a corrective to manualism, he 
exhorts them to recognize how Veritatis Splendor “is far more innovative than 
first appears.”7 
In this light, it seems somewhat strange and paradoxical that today, AL is 
being criticized by self-styled “traditionalists” precisely for breaking away from 
the “traditional” teaching of none other than the “innovative” VS. So what is 
going on?
It is also well known that the most controversial aspect of VS, and the one 
over which much ink has been spilled, is its argument for the “intrinsic evil” of 
particular moral acts based on their “object.” Yet, as contemporary commentators 
like the Swiss philosopher and Opus Dei priest Martin Rhonheimer would 
argue, it is precisely VS’s understanding of the “object of the act” that is its most 
“innovative” aspect. Or, put more compellingly in the words of Pinckaers, that it 
is its understanding of the object of the act that “points out paths that will lead to 
a profound renewal in the way Catholic moral theology is taught.”8 Yet, the now 
famous (or infamous) dubia or “questions for clarification” about the teaching 
of AL presented to Pope Francis by Cardinals Walter Brandmüller, Raymond 
Burke and the now late Carlo Caffarra and Joachim Meisner,9 highlight precisely 
VS’s understanding of the “object of the act” as being (at least potentially) 
contradicted by AL. 
Fifty years after the Council, two possibly conflicting Magisterial documents 
continue to raise controversy in the Church over exactly the same philosophical 
issue, the morality of human acts, and indeed, over the correct interpretation of 
the one they both claim as their primary source, the great Doctor of the Church, 
St. Thomas Aquinas.10 This shows not just how deeply contentious the reform of 
 7 Ibid., 11.
 8 Ibid., 11-12.
 9 See, Edward Pentin, “Full Text and Explanatory Notes of Cardinals’ Questions on Amoris 
Laetitia,” National Catholic Register, November 14, 2016, http://www.ncregister.com/blog/
edward-pentin/full-text-and-explanatory-notes-of-cardinals-questions-on-amoris-laetitia. 
 10 Various articles have sought to contradict Cardinal Schonborn’s claim that AL is “Thomistic.” 
See among others, Richard A. Spinello, “The Morality of Amoris Laetitia is not Thomistic,” 
Crisis Magazine, November 14, 2017, http://www.crisismagazine.com/2017/morality-amoris-
laetitia-not-thomistic and Dorothy Cummings McLean’s interview with Thomas Crean, “Amoris 
Laetitia is ‘ambiguous,’ ‘not a Thomistic document’: Filial Correction signatory,” Lifesite News, 
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moral theology continues to be, and in particular on how divisive “Thomism” 
continues to be, but - as the controversy over AL confirms - how it touches every 
aspect of the church’s ministry and indeed, the very self-identity of the church. 
Hence, why in this article, I focus specifically on the meaning of the “object 
of the act” as implied in the document by Pope Francis that, just like VS twenty 
three years earlier, is being hailed (or condemned - depending on one’s point of 
view) as a “point of no return” for the Catholic Church. But, as I will proceed to 
argue, the meaning given to the “object of the act” is a reflection of something 
much deeper: the kind of framework of moral reasoning and, in turn of pastoral 
praxis, that is operative in the reader of the text. I will contend that VS is in fact 
pushing for a particular framework of moral reasoning for its post-Vatican II 
reform to moral theology. Following Pinckaers and Rhonheimer, I will argue 
that this is a properly “Thomist” framework. Thus, my more general question in 
this article is the following: is AL’s “Thomism,” as emphasized by Pope Francis 
and the Dominican Christoph Cardinal Schönborn,11 in continuation with the 
“Thomist” teaching of VS? If so, then AL should be consistent not just with the 
“spirit” of VS in its application to a specific and highly complex pastoral situation, 
but also more narrowly, in its implied understanding of the “object of the act.” 
Otherwise, one might want to consider the critics’ position, that AL breaks 
with the tradition of VS - even if the critics’ own reading of VS seems to understand 
it less as “an encyclical for the future” and more as a continuation with the (pre-
conciliar?) past.12 If so, what framework of moral reasoning is implied in the 
critics’ reading of VS (and, in turn, of AL) in particular on the issue of the “object 
of the act”? Understood from this wider perspective of “moral framework,” then 
we might also be able to see why the current Pontiff has consistently ignored the 
October 11, 2017, https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/amoris-laetitia-is-ambiguous-not-a-
thomistic-document-filial-correction-sig. 
 11 Cardinal Schönborn has defended AL calling it “an act of the magisterium that makes the 
teaching of the church present and relevant today.” He adds: “I believe that the exhortation has 
its roots in Ignatius and Thomas. We find here the exposition of a moral theology that draws 
inspiration from the great Ignatian tradition (the discernment of the conscience) and the great 
Dominican tradition (virtue ethics). We turn our back on the ethics of obligation, which have an 
extrinsicism that generates both laxity and rigorism. And we rejoin the great tradition of Catholic 
moral theology, which allows us to integrate the entire contribution of personalism.” (Interview 
with Antonio Spadaro, “Cardinal Schönborn on “The Joy of Love”: the full conversation,” 
America: the Jesuit Review, August 09, 2016, https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/richness-
love.
 12 Pentin stresses that “The cardinals make a point in the dubia of repeating three times that VS 
is ‘based on sacred Scripture and on the Tradition of the Church,’” http://www.ncregister.com/
daily-news/four-cardinals-formally-ask-pope-for-clarity-on-amoris-laetitia. 
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dubia, even while he insists on the healing of “moral frameworks” in the tradition 
of “the great Thomas.”13 
Of course, it must also be acknowledged that, at face value, the task of this 
paper - to compare AL to VS - does not seem to be a very obvious or even fruitful 
one. Thus, my first undertaking will be to offer justification for the endevour by 
highlighting the specific point of intersection between the two documents. This 
point of intersection is not just the one stressed by the dubia Cardinals, that is, 
the question of intrinsically evil acts, but the deeper question of how the church 
understands her mission of caring for souls. That understanding is precisely what 
points to the wider consideration of ‘moral frameworks’ in the ongoing reform 
of moral theology. 
The second part of the article, however, will narrow down on the specific 
questions raised by the dubia Cardinals, in particular those on the understanding 
of the “object of the act” in VS. Here I will rely on the work of the Swiss 
philosopher Martin Rhonheimer, who builds on that of Servais Pinckaers, 
to tease out two contrary ways - even if both find their roots in Thomas - of 
understanding the “object of the act”: a pre-conciliar one that emerges from 
a manualistic interpretation of Thomas, and another that claims to retrieve 
Thomas’ own more complex framework of moral reasoning. More to the point, 
it will become apparent that if the former interpretation of the “object of the act” 
will tend to read VS and AL as mutually contradictory, the latter not only can, 
but must read AL as a sound and consistent attempt to apply the teaching of VS 
to one of the most difficult pastoral issues of the day: the divorced and remarried. 
Thus, in the conclusion of the article I will then return to the original question 
of continuity and discontinuity in the ecclesial tradition of moral reasoning. 
Questions surrounding the meaning of the object of the act are not merely a 
matter of philosophical preference, but ultimately, as AL shows, of evangelical 
 13 In his private meeting with Jesuits in Colombia, Pope Francis said: “A second thing: some 
maintain that there is no Catholic morality underlying Amoris Laetitia, or at least, no sure 
morality. I want to repeat clearly that the morality of Amoris Laetitia is Thomist, the morality of 
the great Thomas. You can speak of it with a great theologian, one of the best today and one of the 
most mature, Cardinal Schönborn.” Antonio Spadaro, “Grace is not an Ideology: Pope Francis’ 
Private Conversation with some Colombian Jesuits,” La Civiltà Cattolica (English Edition), 
September 28, 2017, https://laciviltacattolica.com/free-article/grace-is-not-an-ideology-a-
private-conversation-with-some-colombian-jesuits/ 
  Some in the Catholic media considered this to be the Pope’s indirect response to the dubia 
Cardinals. See Joshua J. McElwee, “Francis responds to critics: Morality of Amoris Laetitia is 
Thomist,” National Catholic Reporter, September 28, 2017, https://www.ncronline.org/news/
vatican/francis-responds-critics-morality-amoris-laetitia-thomist. 
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truth and therefore of the authenticity of the church herself as witnessed in her 
pastoral practice. But this attestation is true only insofar as we also understand 
what, in our contemporary cultural context, is at stake for the evangelizing 
mission of the church. The retrieval of a “Thomist” framework of moral reasoning 
initiated by Saint John Paul II and that continues with Pope Francis, is not only 
necessary in our times, but urgent, precisely to fulfill Vatican II’s demands for the 
renewal of moral theology.
AL and VS: What is the Connection?
What is perhaps most interesting about the dubia and, in particular the 
questions they raise about the teaching in VS, is that AL never even refers to 
VS in its voluminous presentation on the challenges to the family. Some have 
argued that this is because AL is seeking to distance itself from a “natural law 
approach” that, the same commentators, associate both with VS more narrowly, 
but also with John Paul II’s moral teachings more generally.14 Nevertheless, AL 
does quote substantially from another work of John Paul II’s that is intimately 
bound to his catechesis on the theology of the body and therefore cannot be 
said to dismiss “natural law”: the 1981 Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation on 
the Family Familiaris Consortio (FC).15 AL insists on continuity with FC, even 
taking on its “law of gradualness” as core pastoral principle. But FC predates VS 
by more than ten years and reflects its own times: not just of cultural transition 
for the Christian family, but of theological and philosophical transition for the 
Church in her reform of moral theology. Would FC be read differently from the 
 14 Michael Sean Winters in his commentary on a conference on AL held at Boston College 
wrote: “One of the most striking features of the conference was what was not said. The phrase 
‘natural law’ was uttered not once. I have noted previously that one of the remarkable things 
about Amoris Laetitia was the lack of references to natural law: It is mentioned once explicitly and 
alluded to in three other instances. This is a huge shift in Catholic theology. St. Pope John Paul II 
would include profound meditations on the Scriptures as part of his magisterial documents like 
Familiaris Consortio, but there remained a heavy reliance on natural law thinking once he turned 
to analysis of the situations confronted, especially family life. The pastoral ineffectiveness of 
natural law thinking is, I suspect, the reason its frames are being discarded.” See “Amoris Laetitia 
conference signals big changes, highlights problems left,” National Catholic Reporter, October 
10, 2017, https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/amoris-laetitia-conference-signals-big-
changes-highlights-problems-left. 
 15 Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris Consortio, November 22, 1981, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_
exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio.html#_ftn180. 
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point of view of VS that sought to treat “more fully and more deeply the issues 
regarding the very foundations of moral theology” (VS, 5)?
Then again, one might want to ask, why should AL refer to VS? VS is famous 
for being concerned about determining the morality of acts, a precondition 
to discerning and judging one’s sinfulness. But AL is not questioning that the 
flock is burdened by sin; rather, it is exhorting pastors that the church’s foremost 
responsibility is to heal wounds, not to condemn the sinner. This is consistent 
with Pope Francis’ insistence that the Good News is of God’s mercy, and that 
evangelization - the foremost task of the church today - is an encounter with 
God’s mercy (Evangelii Gaudium [EG], 3).16 In other words, AL presents 
itself as concerned with an “evangelical” consistency in our pastoral practice, a 
fundamental matter for the self-understanding of the church, since it implies 
that who the church is, and therefore what the church teaches, must be evident 
in how the church acts in her pastoral practice.
At the same time, VS was not only seeking to be a corrective to philosophical 
errors of the times, most notably proportionalism and consequentialism. In no 
uncertain terms, VS took “sin” seriously and, in so doing, it sought to be a return 
to the sources of moral theology. As the dubia Cardinals rightly note, VS “sets 
forth … the principles of a moral teaching based upon Sacred Scripture and the 
living Apostolic Tradition” (VS 5). John Paul II did this with a clear intent to 
fulfill the demands of Optatem totius 16,17 that is, to recover how the foundation 
of all Christian morality is the God-human relationship as revealed in Scripture, 
and that this confirms, on the basis of reason, our inherent desire for God that 
is knowable through what Gaudium et Spes 16 famously termed “conscience.”18 
Thus, VS’s most pressing concern was one of doctrine. But because it was aware 
 16 Pope Francis, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, November 24, 2013, http://
w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_
esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html 
 17 “Let the other theological disciplines be renewed through a more living contact with the 
mystery of Christ and the history of salvation. Special care must be given to the perfecting of 
moral theology. Its scientific exposition, nourished more on the teaching of the Bible, should 
shed light on the loftiness of the calling of the faithful in Christ and the obligation that is theirs 
of bearing fruit in charity for the life of the world.” Pope Paul VI, Decree On Priestly Training 
Optatam Totius, October 28, 1965, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_
council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651028_optatam-totius_en.html 
 18 “In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, 
but which holds him to obedience.” Paul VI, Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The 
Modern World Gaudium Et Spes, December 7, 1965, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_
councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html 
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that the way how priests minister reflects the theology they were taught, the 
encyclical’s primary practical concern was not how pastors are serving their flock 
in the trenches, but how priests were being formed in seminaries and theology 
faculties. 
Yet, while the two issues, of priestly formation and of pastoral work, are 
distinct, they are also deeply intertwined. Indeed, Pope Francis continually 
expresses his concern about how priests should be true pastors, but also that 
it is the responsibility of seminaries to form them as such. An “intellectual 
conversion” in seminary formation as demanded by VS, must be the foundation 
to an authentic “fatherly” attitude in priestly ministry; an attitude that, for Pope 
Francis, is undeniably one of witnessing the “mercy” of the Father that gives joy.19 
Thus, there is a pivotal point where VS and AL intersect. If VS is concerned 
about moral truth, a truth that can ultimately be known and is for the sake of 
our relationship with God, AL is about assisting the flock to discover that truth 
to grow in their relationship with God. The “truth” is two-fold: God’s infinite 
mercy, but also the recognition of our sinfulness that is a pre-condition to truly 
receive God’s mercy and be reconciled with him. VS and AL intersect on the 
crucial matter of the illness in our relationship with God, a sin that needs to be 
properly diagnosed as well as skillfully treated to heal the sinner. In other words, 
VS and AL intersect on the heart of moral theology’s reform named in Lumen 
Gentium as the church’s “universal call to holiness.”20 After Vatican II, moral 
theology must be understood as formation aimed to holiness. 
However, it is also for this same reason of the care of the souls that, as 
the dubia Cardinals note, VS is at pains to show that there are acts that are 
intrinsically evil by virtue of their object; that is, that there are moral actions 
that put us at the risk of spiritual perdition (mortal sin). But in doing so, VS 
 19 For instance, in his Address for the Meeting with Seminarians and Religious Novices ( July 
6, 2013) Pope Francis said: “A journey that matures, that develops towards pastoral fatherhood, 
towards pastoral motherhood, and when a priest is not a father to his community, when a sister 
is not a mother to all those with whom she works, he or she becomes sad. This is the problem. 
For this reason I say to you: the root of sadness in pastoral life is precisely in the absence of 
fatherhood or motherhood that comes from living this consecration unsatisfactorily which 
on the contrary must lead us to fertility. It is impossible to imagine a priest or a sister who are 
not fertile: this is not Catholic! This is not Catholic! This is the beauty of consecration: it is 
joy, joy.” (https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2013/july/documents/papa-
francesco_20130706_incontro-seminaristi.html) 
 20 Pope Paul VI, Dogmatic Constitution On The Church Lumen Gentium, November 21, 
1964, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_
const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html, Ch. 5.
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also teaches what constitutes true discernment and judgment of conscience as 
we determine our sinfulness as malady in our relationship with God. This is the 
point that AL takes up and seeks to elaborate even more vigorously through its 
Ignatian influence: to stress not just proper diagnosis of sin through a process of 
discernment, but also to skillfully treat it through a process of accompaniment 
that seeks re-integration.21 AL, just like FC before it, for all those in “irregular” 
situations seeks a true healing of the sinner’s personal relationship with God, but 
also in the family of God, that is the church. 
This point of intersection between two Magisterial documents that, at face 
value, are radically different, is also significant for reasons that go beyond the 
immediate controversy in the church. This is because it is precisely in this rich 
interface between theory and practice, between theological and philosophical 
articulation and the actual experience of the People of God, that tradition 
flowers. Lex orandi, lex credendi, lex vivendi: how we live and pray shapes how we 
reflect on God’s word, in the same way that theological reflection challenges our 
Christian living and deepens our worship. Likewise, since doctrine shapes praxis, 
the assumption is that VS must structure the theological and philosophical 
presuppositions that order the pastoral reflection of AL - even if this ‘framework’ 
might not be immediately evident. However, one might also ask the opposite: 
if praxis can sharpen our understanding of doctrine, should AL encourage a re-
reading of VS in light of the “pastoral conversion” that EG (27-33) proposes? 
In this space of creative encounter, one should also not lose sight of the 
dangers of misinterpretation. Because the documents are separated by time 
(and, one could also add, rapid cultural shifts); because the intended audiences 
are different; because the concerns and challenges to the Church they discuss 
are different, one should not be surprised that the language used is different. It 
should come as no surprise that the different rhetorical forms of John Paul II, 
the philosopher and teacher arguing for the “splendour of truth,” and of Francis, 
the pastor and pedagogue urging his flock to taste of the “joy of love” as the 
quintessence of the good Christian life, should also imply different forms of 
expression, even if not contradictory substance or “spirit.” The search for and 
articulation of truth requires dialectical sharpness and clear argumentation. But, 
as Pope Francis insists repeatedly, moral truth is not to be found in the realm of 
 21 Nadia Delicata, “Sin, Repentance and Conversion in Amoris Laetitia,” in A Point of No 
Return? Amoris Laetitia on Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage ed. Thomas Knieps-Port le Roi, 
INTAMS Studies on Marriage and the Family (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2017), 74-86. 
246 MELITA THEOLOGICA
ideas, but in the messiness of a personal, relational reality.22 The pastor exhorting 
his flock must necessarily inhabit the concrete world fraught with ambiguity. 
However, as with all church doctrine, the Catholic must start with a 
hermeneutic of continuity, rather than of disruption or even of suspicion; with 
the trust in the Holy Spirit that when the Bishop of Rome speaks, and speaks 
for the synod of bishops, he is speaking with authority that always enlightens 
the church to receive the fullness of the Gospel as demanded by the times.23 Our 
starting point as Catholics must be trust in the authority of Tradition guaranteed 
by the Spirit through apostolicity. As VS itself teaches: 
While exchanges and conflicts of opinion may constitute normal expressions of 
public life in a representative democracy, moral teaching certainly cannot depend 
simply upon respect for a process: indeed, it is in no way established by following 
the rules and deliberative procedures typical of a democracy. Dissent, in the form 
of carefully orchestrated protests and polemics carried on in the media, is opposed 
to ecclesial communion and to a correct understanding of the hierarchical 
constitution of the People of God. Opposition to the teaching of the Church’s 
Pastors cannot be seen as a legitimate expression either of Christian freedom or 
of the diversity of the Spirit’s gifts. When this happens, the Church’s Pastors have 
the duty to act in conformity with their apostolic mission, insisting that the right 
of the faithful to receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity must always 
be respected. “Never forgetting that he too is a member of the People of God, 
the theologian must be respectful of them, and be committed to offering them a 
teaching which in no way does harm to the doctrine of the faith” (113, quoting 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation 
of the Theologian Donum Veritatis, May 24,1990, 11).
A hermeneutic of suspicion, of “doubt” and fear that Popes will “contradict” 
each other rather than enlighten the flock with the truth of the Gospel, is in itself 
against the Catholic spirit. So, on this cluster of fundamental issues - our reality 
as sinners called by God and therefore the salvific mercy of God, but also the 
“manifest” gravity of sin in distinction to “actually being” in a state of mortal sin 
because of factors that reduce imputability - what do VS and AL teach? 
 22 “Realities are more important than ideas” is one of the “four specific principles which can 
guide the development of life in society and the building of a people” (221) that Pope Francis 
identifies in EG 231-233.
 23 Rodrigo Guerra López, “The Relevance of Some Reflections by Karol Wojtyła for 
Understanding Amoris Laetitia: Creative Fidelity.” L’Osservatore Romano, July 22, 2016, http://
www.osservatoreromano.va/en/news/relevance-some-reflections-karol-wojtyla-understan. 
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The Object of the Act and the “Thomism” of VS
The Letter that the four Cardinals addressed to Pope Francis in September 
2016, that was then made public two months later, includes five dubia, three of 
which specifically compare and contrast passages in AL to VS highlighting three 
related themes: 
· AL 304 is contrasted with VS 79 to raise questions regarding “the 
existence of absolute moral norms that prohibit intrinsically evil acts 
and that are binding without exceptions”; 
· AL 302 is contrasted with VS 81 on the understanding of the object of 
the act by asking whether the teaching that “circumstances or intentions 
can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into 
an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice” is still valid;
· AL 303 is contrasted with VS 56 on the understanding of conscience 
to emphasize “that conscience can never be authorized to legitimate 
exceptions to absolute moral norms that prohibit intrinsically evil acts 
by virtue of their object.”
While the first question asks about absolute moral norms that prohibit 
intrinsically evil acts, the second specifies that these are to be judged as such by 
virtue of their “object,” a judgment that happens in conscience, which of itself, 
can never make exceptions to absolute moral norms that prohibit what is evil. 
The third question reveals something of the process of moral reasoning implied 
by the Cardinals: that conscience judges based on established moral norms that 
prohibit intrinsically evil acts absolutely; acts that are known to be such by virtue 
of their “object.” Adultery is such an intrinsically evil act; thus, in conscience, one 
can never make a “legitimate exception” to it.24 What is clear from this process 
 24 As the dubia Cardinals put it: “According to Veritatis Splendor, with intrinsically evil acts 
no discernment of circumstances or intentions is necessary. Uniting oneself to a woman who 
is married to another is and remains an act of adultery, that as such is never to be done, even if 
by doing so an agent could possibly extract precious secrets from a villain’s wife so as to save the 
kingdom (what sounds like an example from a James Bond movie has already been contemplated 
by St. Thomas Aquinas, De Malo, q. 15, a. 1). John Paul II argues that the intention (say, “saving 
the kingdom”) does not change the species of the act (here: “committing adultery”), and that it 
is enough to know the species of the act (“adultery”) to know that one must not do it.” (http://
www.ncregister.com/blog/edward-pentin/full-text-and-explanatory-notes-of-cardinals-
questions-on-amoris-laetitia) 
  As will become clearer later, this point is countered by AL 305: “305. For this reason, a pastor 
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of reasoning is that, while there is a clear assumption that conscience’s duty is 
to abide with norms, the norm itself is such because it hinges on what is being 
meant by the “object of the act” that gives an act its moral character.25 So how 
does VS understand the meaning of “object of the act”?
cannot feel that it is enough simply to apply moral laws to those living in ‘irregular’ situations, 
as if they were stones to throw at people’s lives. This would bespeak the closed heart of one used 
to hiding behind the Church’s teachings, ‘sitting on the chair of Moses and judging at times with 
superiority and superficiality difficult cases and wounded families.’ Along these same lines, the 
International Theological Commission has noted that ‘natural law could not be presented as an 
already established set of rules that impose themselves a priori on the moral subject; rather, it is 
a source of objective inspiration for the deeply personal process of making decisions.’ Because 
of forms of conditioning and mitigating factors, it is possible that in an objective situation of 
sin - which may not be subjectively culpable, or fully such - a person can be living in God’s grace, 
can love and can also grow in the life of grace and charity, while receiving the Church’s help to 
this end. Discernment must help to find possible ways of responding to God and growing in the 
midst of limits. By thinking that everything is black and white, we sometimes close off the way 
of grace and of growth, and discourage paths of sanctification which give glory to God. Let us 
remember that ‘a small step, in the midst of great human limitations, can be more pleasing to God 
than a life which appears outwardly in order, but moves through the day without confronting 
great difficulties.’ The practical pastoral care of ministers and of communities must not fail to 
embrace this reality.” 
  This paragraph from AL suggests that while a person might be aware of a particular norm, 
because of their “conditioning”, and therefore lack of rectitude of appetite, they might still 
have severe difficulties in truly grasping its meaning for their life. For that reason, “from the 
perspective of the acting person” the act literally takes a different meaning. It does not mean that 
the meaning given by the agent is necessarily the true one. This is not relativism. But it does mean 
that the more fundamental challenge of all accompaniment is formation of conscience through 
progressive discipline for greater rectitude of appetite. As the person becomes more virtuous (in 
particular more temperate and courageous, in order to be just and prudent), they will also be able 
to grasp and appropriate the natural law more truthfully. 
 25 In his interview with Edward Pentin one year after the dubia were made public, Cardinal 
Burke replied thus to Pentin’s question:
  Pentin: “What tangible effect has this mix of interpretations had?”
  Burke: “This hermeneutical confusion has already produced a sad result. In fact, the 
ambiguity regarding a concrete point of the pastoral care of the family has led some to propose a 
paradigm shift regarding the Church’s entire moral practice, the foundations of which have been 
authoritatively taught by St. John Paul II in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor.
  Indeed, a process has been put into motion that is subversive of essential parts of the 
Tradition. Concerning Christian morality, some claim that absolute moral norms need to be 
relativized and that a subjective, self-referential conscience needs to be given a - ultimately equivocal 
- primacy in matters touching morals. What is at stake, therefore, is in no way secondary to the 
kerygma or basic Gospel message. We are speaking about whether or not a person’s encounter 
with Christ can, by the grace of God, give form to the path of the Christian life so that it may be 
in harmony with the Creator’s wise design.”
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VS offers a lengthy section (71-83) that discusses the moral act, the object of 
the act and intrinsically evil acts, but the dubia Cardinals focus on merely two 
paragraphs (79 and 81) from this section. Lest these paragraphs are read out of 
context, it is important to briefly describe the entire section. Next, I will present 
key fragments from Pinckaers’ and Rhonheimer’s work that tease out differing 
interpretations from the tradition on the “human act” and the “object of the act,” 
that, in turn, reflect two modes of moral reasoning. Lastly, I will suggest that the 
process of discernment, accompaniment and integration in AL assumes the need 
for an ongoing ‘naming’ of personal sinfulness. My contention will be that this 
relies on a “Thomist” understanding of the object of the act, even as retrieved by 
VS, but whose determination is not static, but rather dynamic, as the person who 
grows in virtue always seeks to approximate better the truth, even the truth about 
their past and present actions, in their growth to holiness.26 Needless to say, this 
reading will contrast sharply with the more static and normative interpretation 
of the object of the act in VS assumed by the dubia Cardinals, as evident from 
the questions themselves. 
VS’s first step is to introduce what constitutes a “moral act.” This is crucial, 
since as VS implies, it is not any happening or activity that has a moral “object,” 
but only properly “human” acts. Para. 71-72a will suffice to show how these 
“moral acts” have both a subjective and objective dimension; the former as an 
expression of human freedom, the latter as measured by the authentic human 
good known through the right exercise of reason (rather than by “norms” per se, 
even if norms should reflect such a “right” exercise of reason). 
The relationship between man’s freedom and God’s law, which has its intimate 
and living centre in the moral conscience, is manifested and realized in human 
acts. It is precisely through his acts that man attains perfection as man, as one 
who is called to seek his Creator of his own accord and freely to arrive at full and 
blessed perfection by cleaving to him. 
Human acts are moral acts because they express and determine the goodness or 
evil of the individual who performs them. They do not produce a change merely 
in the state of affairs outside of man but, to the extent that they are deliberate 
  “Cardinal Burke Addresses the Dubia One Year After Their Publication,” National Catholic 
Register, November 14, 2017, http://www.ncregister.com/blog/edward-pentin/cardinal-burke-
addresses-the-dubia-one-year-after-their-publication, my emphasis.
 26 See Marc Cardinal Ouellet, “Accompanying, Discerning, Integrating Weakness,” 
L’Osservatore Romano, November 21, 2017, http://www.osservatoreromano.va/en/news/
accompanying-discerning-integrating-weakness. 
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choices, they give moral definition to the very person who performs them, 
determining his profound spiritual traits (71, emphasis in original).
This introductory paragraph is at pains to show that a moral act is such only 
as an expression of human freedom, a freedom ordered to God, the alpha and 
omega of our existence. When a person acts, the act reflects his or her own 
being and desire for becoming “by cleaving to” God. What we do consciously, 
and therefore with full knowledge and intent, reflects this existential drama. 
A “human” and therefore “moral” act is such because we consciously put our 
very self, desirous of God, into what we do and how we act. One should note, 
however, that the opposite of this dynamic is just as true. When, because of 
various factors, our freedom to act is diminished, our actions become somewhat 
less that human, and for that reason, we cannot be held to be fully responsible for 
them. Errors or gaps in our awareness, experience and understanding, condition 
and constrict our freedom, diminishing our intentionality, and therefore our 
very power to act. These factors have traditionally been reflected upon in the 
context of determining sinfulness for sacramental confession, since they reduce 
culpability even for actions whose “matter” is objectively grave. 
The morality of acts is defined by the relationship of man’s freedom with the 
authentic good. This good is established, as the eternal law, by Divine Wisdom 
which orders every being towards its end: this eternal law is known both by man’s 
natural reason (hence it is “natural law”), and - in an integral and perfect way - by 
God’s supernatural Revelation (hence it is called “divine law”). Acting is morally 
good when the choices of freedom are in conformity with man’s true good and 
thus express the voluntary ordering of the person towards his ultimate end: God 
himself, the supreme good in whom man finds his full and perfect happiness 
(72a, emphasis in original).
Our desire for becoming, expressed through freely appropriated actions, is 
measured by the objective good, a standard of authentic flourishing according to 
our human nature. It is God the Creator who orders our telos, but human beings 
can know this ordering of becoming, and therefore what constitutes authentic 
human flourishing, through the right exercise of reason as participation in the 
eternal law. Natural law as the virtuous (prudential) exercise of practical reason, 
whose first principle is to seek good and avoid evil, can determine what is the 
good that we can accomplish in the here and now, but always in the light of 
the ultimate good. As that good is appropriated and freely chosen, it makes 
our action properly intentional and good (that is, reflecting the ultimate good 
in the particular moment). When human reason is too fragile to grasp divine 
reason, in particular when reason is blinded by sin, God not only reveals to us 
our ultimate good - most transparently in the Incarnation of his Son - but assists 
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our determination of how to manifest it in our daily life in the power of the Holy 
Spirit through infused virtues. 
Moral acts are objectively good when the person grasps rightly how they 
contribute to their authentic flourishing and takes responsibility for their 
personal and communal becoming. When this goodness, knowable through the 
right exercise of reason is rejected, the person not only chooses what is objectively 
contrary to the good, but also harms himself or herself, since their personal 
flourishing is necessarily stultified or diminished. This is what the tradition will 
describe as human acts that are “intrinsically evil,” of an evil character.
The rational ordering of the human act to the good in its truth and the voluntary 
pursuit of that good, known by reason, constitute morality. Hence human activity 
cannot be judged as morally good merely because it is a means for attaining one or 
another of its goals, or simply because the subject’s intention is good. Activity is 
morally good when it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the person 
to his ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action with the human good 
as it is acknowledged in its truth by reason. If the object of the concrete action is 
not in harmony with the true good of the person, the choice of that action makes 
our will and ourselves morally evil, thus putting us in conflict with our ultimate 
end, the supreme good, God himself (72b).
If a truly moral act is necessarily rational (conforming to the ultimate good) 
and voluntary (the act is intended because it conforms to the ultimate good), 
it follows that morality cannot be equated simply with “a means for attaining 
one or another of its goals” (an argument against consequentialism) “or simply 
because the subject’s intention is good.” “Intention” here needs to be understood 
not as the voluntariness that determines the morality of the particular human 
act, but as ulterior motivations, as is typically understood in proportionalism. 
VS specifies this reading of “intention” as ulterior motivation in its discussion on 
intrinsically evil acts: 
Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature 
“incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good 
of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral 
tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum): they are such 
always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart 
from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances (80, italics is my 
emphasis). 
Indeed, the next sentence in para. 72 confirms once more the crucial 
importance of intentionality in moral acts when it stresses that “activity is morally 
good when it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the person to his 
ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action with the human good as it 
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is acknowledged in its truth by reason.” One’s desire for authentic self-becoming 
is expressed analogically in every “moral” action; that is, in every action one 
undertakes in full awareness and responsibility. This reasonable intentionality 
expressed in concrete action is the “object of the concrete action” or the “object 
of the act.” 
Paragraph 78a of VS specifies even more clearly what the encyclical means by 
“object of the act” and in doing so, refers directly to Thomas.
The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the “object” 
rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is borne out by the insightful analysis, 
still valid today, made by Saint Thomas (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.18, a. 6.). 
In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, 
it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The 
object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent 
that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of 
the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in 
the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one 
cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on 
the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. 
Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines 
the act of willing on the part of the acting person (emphasis in original).
As we will see in Rhonheimer’s discussion of the morality of VS, this is 
the linchpin of the encyclical’s philosophy of human action: the person’s 
understanding and appropriation of their action determines its morality. Thus, 
the determination of the “object of the act” can only be done “in the perspective 
of the acting person” and, as the concluding paragraph of this section of VS 
attests, this teaching conforms to how the church understands who the human 
being is. The question of the “object of the act” is an anthropological question, 
a question of the “truth” we attest to about ourselves as human beings. If in the 
Church’s pastoral practice this truth is not acknowledged, or is not respected, 
the Church would be contradicting a fundamental tenet about her very existence 
as a community of men and women chosen by God.
As is evident, in the question of the morality of human acts, and in particular the 
question of whether there exist intrinsically evil acts, we find ourselves faced with 
the question of man himself, of his truth and of the moral consequences flowing 
from that truth. By acknowledging and teaching the existence of intrinsic evil in 
given human acts, the Church remains faithful to the integral truth about man; 
she thus respects and promotes man in his dignity and vocation (83).
The specification of the “object of the act” from “the perspective of the acting 
person” is the core philosophical teaching of VS. Pinckaers and Rhonheimer also 
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argue it is a core teaching in the philosophy of action of Thomas Aquinas. In a 
famous, 1986 essay titled “A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts,”27 
Pinckaers argues that it is “the first foundation regarding the moral quality of 
acts.” He considers it to be pivotal to ask: “Does this moral quality flow from 
the nature of actions in conjunction with a truly natural law, or does it depend 
essentially on an external law with its precepts and prohibitions? What we are 
concerned with here is the intrinsic or extrinsic character of morality, as well as 
the objectivity of moral judgments in general.”28 
It is also no secret that Pinckaers’ core argument for the superiority of Thomas’ 
virtue ethics centers precisely on this issue of how morality is to be understood as 
“intrinsic” to the human person rather than as “extrinsic.”29 However, Pinckaers 
also argues that through the philosophical errors of Nominalism, the church 
appropriated an increasingly “extrinsicist” morality that culminated with the 
low casuistry of the manuals. In this essay, Pinckaers traces how this extinsicist 
understanding of morality also distorted Thomas’ understanding of the “object 
of the act,” reducing it to something that contradicts its spirit.
Pinckaers argues that in his “great classical analysis of moral action,” “St. 
Thomas makes of the end and the matter of the act the elements of the action. 
For him, the end is the principal (principalissima) element of the action, that 
which moves the agent to action and which directly involves the will. The second 
element is what is done, the matter of the action, which forms its substance.”30 It 
follows that “the interior and external act, the intention directed to the end and 
the choice of the matter, are ordered to each other therefore as form and matter, 
we might say, as soul and body, to constitute the morality of the action.”31 
This is the proper “object” of the moral act, since for Thomas, “the term 
“object” does not signify a material thing as contrasted with a person, but the 
reality placed before the reason or will as its matter, and this could easily be God 
or another person when one is talking about the object of love. Nor is the object 
opposed to the end, for he will say that the end is the proper object of the will 
 27 Servais Pinckaers, “A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts,” in The Pinckaers 
Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology eds. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus 
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 185-235.
 28 Ibid.,187.
 29 Pinckaers’ celebrated The Sources of Christian Ethics (Washington D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1995) 327-378 makes this point strongly contrasting the understanding of 
freedom implied in obligational moral theories and in virtue moral theories. See also his shorter 
Morality: The Catholic View (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001). 
 30 Pinckaers, “A Historical Perspective,” 201.
 31 Ibid., 204-205.
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and designates the reality that the will seeks through desire and love. “With St. 
Thomas, therefore there is no identification between the object and the matter of the 
act, as there is with modern moralists.”32
Pinckaers’ historical reconstruction of the changing meaning of the “object 
of the act” from Thomas to the manualists, the latter being also appropriated 
by consequentialists and proportionalists,33 shows how after the crisis of 
Nominalism, the meaning of “object of the act” becomes contrary to that 
intended by Aquinas. Modern moralists introduce a “separation between the finis 
operis, which designates the end inherent to the act and is identified practically 
with its object, and the finis operantis, or the end added by the one who acts.”34 
Pinckaers argues in no uncertain terms: 
St. Thomas did not believe the distinction between finis operis and finis operantis 
necessary for the analysis of the composite parts of morality. … The end being the 
proper object of the will, all finality, even external, is led to the voluntary finality 
and integrated with it when it is taken up by voluntary action. 
But later on, a new concept of morality and of action will lead interpreters of St. 
Thomas to consider this separation essential to moral finality. It will enable them 
to discard with ease those texts of Thomas which prevent them from focusing the 
moral judgment on the object of the act (its matter) and reducing the end sought 
by the acting subject to the rank of a circumstance.35
Perhaps the foremost of these texts that show how Thomas’ understanding 
of the object of the act was “from the perspective of the acting subject” and not 
merely the “matter” of the action, is the one from the Summa Theologiae that VS 
itself refers to in para. 78:
Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above 
(I-II:1:1). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior 
action of the will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its object. 
The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object 
of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore 
just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears; so 
the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper 
object.
 32 Ibid., 203, my emphasis.
 33 See Servais Pinckaers, “Revisionist Understandings of Actions in the Wake of Vatican II,” in 
The Pinckaers Reader, 236-270.
 34 Pinckaers, “A Historical Perspective,” 209-210.
 35 Ibid., 210.
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Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the 
part of the external action: because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; 
nor have external actions any measure of morality, save in so far as they are 
voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with 
regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. 
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that “he who steals that he may commit 
adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief ” (ST I-II.18.6).
Thomas’ own example illustrates his point evocatively, precisely because 
it shows that a “reading” of the action from “outside” is necessary, but does 
not always suffice to determine with clarity the morality of a human act, and 
concomitantly, the spiritual state of the person. This, in fact, is the core argument 
that Rhonheimer develops in his essay on VS in his collection of essays on the 
object of the act, aptly titled The Perspective of the Acting Person.36 
Rhonheimer notes that the philosophical “problematic” of the object of 
the act “consists in confusing the viewpoint of the ‘first person’ (the agent’s 
perspective) with the viewpoint of the ‘third person’ (the observer’s viewpoint). 
To a large extent, these two perspectives correspond to two quite different 
concepts of human action: the intentional and the causal-eventistic concept.”37 
Rhonheimer uses this distinction to emphasize how the consequentialist and 
proportionalist perspectives that VS criticizes are heirs of modern utilitarianism 
that, in their emphasis on the analysis of effects, take “the observer’s viewpoint.” 
In distinction, as we have seen in the analysis of VS, just like Thomas, the 
encyclical understands moral action from the agent’s perspective, stressing his or 
her intentionality. The difference in these two ways of conceiving of the object 
of the act becomes evident when we consider Rhonheimer’s own example: “‘to 
kill P’ is not simply ‘to cause P’s being dead,’ but rather it is to choose, to intend, 
to want P’s death (for the sake of whatever further end)”38 (author’s emphasis). 
Likewise, following Thomas and VS, Rhonheimer argues that the goods that we 
seek, we seek them precisely because we desire them, we choose them, we intend 
them, since we perceive them as good for us. 
There is, however, another distinction that is assumed in the two different 
understandings of human action that Rhonheimer considers: that between “moral 
rightness” and “moral goodness.” In this distinction as well, the former “concerns 
 36 Martin Rhonheimer, “‘Intrinsically Evil Acts’ and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a Central 
Teaching of Veritatis Splendor,” in The Perspective of the Acting Person: Essays in the Renewal of 
Thomistic Moral Philosophy ed. William F. Murphy (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2008), 37-67.
 37 Ibid., 45.
 38 Ibid., 46-47.
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the question about the properties which render an action “right” or “wrong”; 
the second is related to those properties of an action insofar as it springs from 
a free will.”39 (author’s emphasis) Teleological ethicists (consequentialists and 
proportionalists) separate “moral rightness” from “moral goodness,” considering 
the former as a question of normative ethics, while the latter is judged on the 
basis of whether the person acts out of benevolence or not. Thus, in this schema, 
one can have an action that is “morally good” even if, normatively, it is deemed to 
be “wrong,” or vice versa. That is, this schema relies on the manualist distinction 
between the finis operis and finis operantis, even if it might disagree with the 
outcome of its “extrinsicist” moral analysis.
Rhonheimer argues that this distinction belies the confusion that emerges 
when considering moral action under two aspects, but failing to see their 
intrinsic unity. The first perspective reduces moral action to a merely “technical” 
consideration (has one done the right thing?), as Pinckaers also argues when 
he shows how the rise of casuistry and the moral manuals tended to rely on an 
understanding of morality as implying “technical ends.”40 Still, as Thomas argues, 
true moral goodness must include not only a consideration of goodwill, but also 
a consideration of what is effectively being done to achieve it (the “matter” of 
the act). In other words, moral goodness must also consider what is concretely 
morally at stake in a particular situation. A “good moral” action must be “rightly” 
executed, which implies, not just a good intention, but the right (or fitting) 
choice of what exactly to do. 
Hence, the distinction between “right-making properties” and “good-making 
properties” is in principle questionable. We always have to describe actions and 
behaviours as objects of choices and, therefore, as intentional actions. From such 
a perspective, however, the goodness of the will is regarded as depending on the 
goodness of freely chosen, wanted actions which also includes the agent’s willingly 
referring to the specific goal which constitutes the objective intentionality of this 
action. … That is why acts of choice are always describable as forms of rightness, that 
is of the rightness of desire or of the will41 (Italics, my emphasis).
This “rightness of desire or of the will,” that is, that one wills what is truly good 
in the particular situation, is not something that can be assessed using “norms 
(or rules)”: “‘norm-ethics’ are ‘objectivist’ in the sense that they may not, on the 
level of the concrete performance of actions, include in their reflection the acting 
subject and his willingly ‘taking a position’ with regard to “good” and “evil” in 
 39 Ibid., 49.
 40 Pinckaers, “A Historical Perspective,” 208.
 41 Rhonheimer, “Intrinsically Evil Acts,” 52.
Amoris Laetitia and Veritatis Splendor - Nadia Delicata 257
choosing this or that particular action” (author’s emphasis).42 As Rhonheimer 
puts it, like all modern moral philosophies that are heirs to Nominalism, even 
Kantian ethics “shares with utilitarianism and discourse-ethics the central 
characteristic of every norm-ethics, which is to judge actions from the point of 
view of an observer, from a standpoint outside that of the acting subject.”43 
The classical virtue ethics approach, on the other hand, “holds that there are 
actions which are evil despite the best of intentions, or despite the foreseen and 
intended outcomes, precisely because the choice of this particular kind of action 
through which these laudible intentions are meant to be fulfilled must already 
be considered as morally evil.”44 But this moral evil stems from something much 
deeper than mere intended consequences, because it stems from a “lack” in the 
acting person himself or herself. As Rhonheimer puts it, 
Moral virtue is not only, as it is sometimes asserted, the will or the free 
determination to do “the right thing” each time. Were it like this, there would 
exist only one single moral virtue. Instead moral virtue is the habitual rightness 
of appetite (of sensual affections, passions, and of the will, the rational appetite) 
related to the various spheres of human praxis. An act which is according to 
virtue is an act which is suited to cause this habitual rightness of appetite which 
produces “the good person.”45 
Or alternatively, the key feature that enables the person to determine what 
would be the best way to act in every situation is the “goodness or wickedness of 
appetite,” that not only facilitates the agent’s grasp of what is morally at stake in 
every situation together with the choice of the most fitting action, but is revealed 
in one’s interactions with others in their context or situation.
Thus, a morality that is “from the perspective of the acting person” is inherently 
a “personalist” morality, that first and foremost considers both “personal” and 
“communal” well being; and therefore, that is inherently “just” by manifesting 
the agent’s own virtue.
In reality, as acting subjects, we neither observe nor follow norms or rules, nor 
do we work out our decisions each time exclusively on the basis of foreseeable 
consequences for all those affected by our actions. Instead, human action, realizes 
itself in the context of definite “moral relationships,” the relationships between 
concrete persons (fellow-men, friends, married persons, parents and children, 
 42 Ibid., 52-53.
 43 Martin Rhonheimer, The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic 
Virtue Ethics (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 9.
 44 Rhonheimer, “Intrinsically Evil Acts,” 53.
 45 Ibid., 54.
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superiors and subordinates, employer and employee, creditor and debtor, 
physician and patient, partners in a contract, persons who live in a particular 
community, etc.). Here, it is always concerned with what we owe to others, with 
the question of right and of good will toward particular fellow-men, with the 
question of responsibilities toward concrete persons.46
Based on this analysis, it becomes obvious that not only is VS recovering a 
morality of virtue that begins with “the perspective of the acting person,” but 
that in doing so, it is also recovering an inherently “personalist” morality in 
distinction to the individualist moralities of the modern era, “where one’s own 
interests are limited by the interests of another.”47 In doing so, VS also enhances 
a personalist anthropology where every person’s well being is reached not only 
in communion with others in society, and therefore according to nature, but 
ultimately and in the power of grace, in communion with God. A truly Christian 
theological anthropology necessitates this retrieval, because the alternative is the 
insipid and “idealist” (rather than “realist”) morality of the manuals that the 
Second Vatican Council sought to heal and correct.
Now we are in a position to contrast this “Thomist” understanding of the 
object of the act as promoted by VS in the encyclical’s quest to reform moral 
theology with the dubia about AL raised by the four Cardinals.
The dubia identify two quotes from VS that are central to their concerns 
about the object of the act:
The primary and decisive element for moral judgment is the object of the human 
act, which establishes whether it is capable of being ordered to the good and to the 
ultimate end, which is God. This capability is grasped by reason in the very being of 
man, considered in his integral truth, and therefore in his natural inclinations, his 
motivations and his finalities, which always have a spiritual dimension as well. It 
is precisely these which are the contents of the natural law and hence that ordered 
complex of “personal goods” which serve the “good of the person”: the good 
which is the person himself and his perfection. These are the goods safeguarded 
by the commandments, which, according to Saint Thomas, contain the whole 
natural law (VS 79, emphasis in original).
“Circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue 
of its object into an act “subjectively” good or defensible as a choice” (VS 81).
Interestingly, the first paragraph could be read as if the measure for the morality 
of the act is not, strictly speaking understood to be “intrinsic” to the person who 
 46 Ibid., 55-56.
 47 Rhonheimer, Perspective of Morality, 9.
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grasps the moral meaning of action in his or her conscience, but in Pinckaers’ 
words, more “extrinsically,” that is, quite literally (rather than metaphorically) 
as “the contents of the natural law… safeguarded by the commandments.” If that 
is the case, then one could also see, why the second quote is chosen, precisely to 
highlight that the “object of the act” must be distinguished from “circumstances 
or intentions.” If the morality of an act is measured by external norms, then it 
has to follow that the operative moral framework is also normative, “causal-
eventistic” and impersonal.
Let us not forget that this was one of the Cardinals’ core criticisms of AL as 
suggested in the way they contrasted the VS’s text on the “object of the act” with 
AL 304:
It is reductive simply to consider whether or not an individual’s actions correspond 
to a general law or rule, because that is not enough to discern and ensure full 
fidelity to God in the concrete life of a human being. I earnestly ask that we 
always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and learn to incorporate it in 
our pastoral discernment: “Although there is necessity in the general principles, 
the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter 
defects... In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, 
as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles; and where there is the 
same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all... The principle 
will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail”. It is true that 
general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in 
their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations. At the 
same time, it must be said that, precisely for that reason, what is part of a practical 
discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level of a rule. 
That would not only lead to an intolerable casuistry, but would endanger the very 
values which must be preserved with special care. 
It becomes evident that AL’s argument here is precisely “from the perspective 
of the acting person.” Indeed, following Thomas, AL argues that if one is to 
be truly just in his or her relationships to others (and therefore reason from a 
personalist, or virtue morality) it must be acknowledged that complex situations 
require discernment way beyond the mere application of norms. At the same time, 
it would also have to be acknowledged that the very moral grasp of the situation 
would differ according to the rectitude of appetite of the agent himself or herself. 
Thus, the reason why AL, in continuity with the teaching of FC, proposes a “law 
of gradualness,” since the complexity of the situation together with the poverty 
of the agent, demands an ongoing discernment to not only grasp more clearly 
what is morally salient in the particular situation, but also to act with greater 
prudence in order to be more just towards all involved. Likewise, as the agent 
looks back on his or her past actions, they would also learn to reconsider the 
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moral meaning of their actions and, consequently to name and rename their 
sin. As they mature in virtue, their understanding of past sinfulness would also 
become more “integral” and “realistic” as the person is enabled to name their sin 
with greater clarity and candour.48 
Likewise, AL 302, the other text noted by the dubia Cardinals, argues:
A negative judgment about an objective situation does not imply a judgment 
about the imputability or culpability of the person involved. On the basis of these 
convictions, I consider very fitting what many Synod Fathers wanted to affirm: 
“Under certain circumstances people find it very difficult to act differently. 
Therefore, while upholding a general rule, it is necessary to recognize that 
responsibility with respect to certain actions or decisions is not the same in all 
cases. Pastoral discernment, while taking into account a person’s properly formed 
conscience, must take responsibility for these situations. Even the consequences 
of actions taken are not necessarily the same in all cases.
It is clear that when AL mentions “circumstances,” these are not, in fact, 
extraneous to the moral action of the person himself. They are rather, the 
complex situation in which he or she is seeking to grasp what is truly most 
morally salient and therefore, to make the most fitting decision about how to 
act. Just as, for the one who understands the meaning of the holy object, stealing 
a chalice from a tabernacle is properly an act of sacrilege, so the judgment of how 
to act in a complex situation must consider more than the mere action for the 
proper evaluation of the morality of the act. In such situations, precisely because 
there are sufficiently complex that the mere application of a rule is unjust, then 
 48 In his article in L’Osservatore Romano cited earlier, Cardinal Ouellet makes this crucial 
point about the disciplinary practice of participating in holy communion for the divorced and 
remarried: “I would add, even if this is implicit in the text of AL, that the help of the sacraments in 
“certain cases” may have a provisional character depending on the maturity of the couple who are 
seeking reintegration in the Church. It may well be that such help might be granted for a period 
where individuals discern that this help is necessary for them in conscience. The same individuals 
may then give these up later in their journey, not out of rigorism but as a free choice, by virtue 
of the fact that, with competent and respectful help, they have arrived at a better understanding 
that the help of the sacraments for their growth in grace does not resolve the contradiction between 
their public state of life and the sacramental meaning of Eucharistic communion. In such a case they 
might refrain, not above all for fear of scandal (an ecclesiological motive) but out of respect for 
the divine companion whose ecclesial witness they do not wish to sully (a theological motive) by 
a sacramental communion that is subjectively compatible with their state of grace, but objectively 
incompatible with their state of life. Such a spiritual attitude, aware of the ecclesial meaning of 
sacramental communion, goes beyond the subjective desire for one’s own sacramental benefit 
and favours an objective service to offer to the divine witness expressed in the sacramental 
communion of Christ and the Church” (my emphasis in italics).
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it follows that, even if persons do not act in an ideal manner, that is, in a manner 
that fully exemplifies the good, this is not solely because their conscience is ill-
formed, but also because the situation itself limits what can be realistically, and 
therefore prudently, be done. 
What is more important for our current discussion on the continuity or 
discontinuity between VS and AL, however, is that these texts actually reveal 
how AL embodies the moral reasoning exemplified in Thomas’ virtue ethics, 
and in contrast to modern “normative” moralities, whether they are of the 
consequentialist or proportionalist streak as criticized by VS, or even of the 
deontological streak evident in pre-conciliar manualist moral theology as 
criticized by Pinckaers. The real question that one should perhaps ask is whether 
the dubia imply a framework of moral reasoning that is “from the perspective of 
the acting person,” or whether it is in fact, more “normative.” If the latter is the 
case, than ironically, it would be the Cardinals who have mistaken the essence of 
VS’s teaching and of the reform to moral theology that it sought to promulgate. 
The Church’s Pastoral Practice is a Matter of Evangelical Truth
So far, I have tried to argue that contrary to the “doubts” raised by Cardinal 
Burke and his colleagues, I can see no doctrinal disruptions between VS and 
AL. In fact, quite the contrary: as I have tried to show, albeit too briefly, AL is 
grounded in the morality of “the great Thomas” as was VS before it. If anything, 
AL attempts to be thoroughly consistent with that Thomist ethic even in the 
messiness of very complex situations. It exhorts that all priests apply in their 
ministry of the healing of souls precisely that ancient discernment and spiritual 
accompaniment, beautifully summarized in the virtue ethic retrieved by VS, 
that does not immediately judge from an “observer’s perspective”, but truly 
honours the sinner’s spiritual journey to grow in God. As Pope Francis puts it so 
eloquently to fellow pastors: “We have been called to form consciences, not to 
replace them” (AL 37). 
Yet, one has to admit, that the controversies surrounding AL will not simply 
rest because of doctrinal consistency with the tradition (a matter, that should have 
been taken of course even by the harshest of critics). Rather, the truly controversial 
aspect is what Thomas’ teaching should imply, not just for the discernment of 
sinfulness, but for the pastoral practice of the church in her ministry of healing. 
Even more specifically, what it should imply for the “disciplinary” practices of 
the church - that in situations of “irregularity” are always necessary to protect 
the faithful from scandal - but, at the same time, continue to encourage the 
manifestation of God’s mercy in the healing ministry with sinners. As is well 
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known, in these past decades it has been especially difficult for the church to 
achieve this balance in particular in ministry with the divorced and remarried.
Much ink has been spilled (and vitriol exchanged online) on the question of 
whether the divorced and remarried should be allowed access to the sacraments 
of Reconciliation and the Eucharist. Interestingly, while AL in the now famous 
(or infamous) footnote 351 (but also footnote 336) does not exclude in principle 
the possibility, it also makes it clear that this decision of pastoral practice, 
including therefore, the decision of how to discipline, should rest squarely on 
the shoulders of individual bishops. As AL in its introduction makes clear: 
Unity of teaching and practice is certainly necessary in the Church, but this 
does not preclude various ways of interpreting some aspects of that teaching or 
drawing certain consequences from it. This will always be the case as the Spirit 
guides us towards the entire truth (cf. Jn 16:13), until he leads us fully into the 
mystery of Christ and enables us to see all things as he does. Each country or 
region, moreover, can seek solutions better suited to its culture and sensitive to its 
traditions and local needs. (3)
The Nominalist crisis brought in the church not just a more “normative” 
and casuistical morality. It also brought into the church an expectation of 
“uniformity” in every single aspect of ecclesial life, including the liturgical and the 
disciplinary. As is well known, when it comes to the discipline on the partaking 
of the Eucharist, two important canons rule this practice: canon 916 which 
rules the person himself or herself who in their conscience must judge whether 
they are worthy to receive the Body of Christ. But also canon 915 that rules the 
minister who is prohibited from administering the Eucharist to “those who have 
been excommunicated or interdicted after the imposition or declaration of the 
penalty and others obstinately persevering in manifest grave sin.” 
AL is contentious - at least as detractors see it - because, like FC before it, it 
suggests the possibility of opening the door to the sacraments of Reconciliation 
and the Eucharist for the divorced and remarried, and therefore, for those whom 
tradition teaches should be disciplined because they are “obstinately persevering 
in manifest grave sin” (canon 915, my emphasis). Cardinal Burke confirmed 
this when, a year after making public the five dubia (and still without a formal 
response from the Pope), in the interview with Edward Pentin of the National 
Catholic Register he lamented:
Over and above the moral debate, the sense of the ecclesial sacramental practice is 
increasingly eroding in the Church, especially when it comes to the sacraments of 
penance and the Eucharist. The decisive criterion for admission to the sacraments 
has always been the coherence of a person’s way of life with the teachings of Jesus. 
If instead the decisive criterion were now to become the absence of a person’s 
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subjective culpability - as some interpreters of Amoris Laetitia have suggested - 
would this not change the very nature of the sacraments? In fact, the sacraments 
are not private encounters with God, nor are they means of social integration 
into a community. Rather, they are visible and effective signs of our incorporation 
into Christ and his Church, in and by which the Church publicly professes and 
actuates her faith. Thus, by turning a person’s subjective diminished culpability or 
lack of culpability into the decisive criterion for the admission to the sacraments, 
one would endanger the very regula fidei, the rule of faith, which the sacraments 
proclaim and actuate not only by words, but also by visible gestures.
Yet, if one had to stretch the logic that participation in the sacraments is a 
“visible and effective sign of our incorporation into Christ and his Church,” then 
it would follow that only the perfect are worthy of reception. However, even 
though the Christian must always strive towards the ideal of holiness, it is hubris 
to assume that we are not sinners and, pastoral ministry must begin precisely 
where the sinner is. In the evocative fourth chapter of AL - its very heart -Pope 
Francis makes it clear that “after the love that unites us to God, conjugal love 
is ‘the greatest form of friendship’” (123).49 Yet, he also adds, “in marriage, the 
joy of love needs to be cultivated” (126). Likewise, in both EG and AL Pope 
Francis stresses that the sacrament of “the Eucharist, although it is the fullness 
of sacramental life, is not a prize for the perfect but a powerful medicine and 
nourishment for the weak” (EG, 47). Thus, the fundamental principle of pastoral 
ministry of AL is the same one taught in EG: 
Without detracting from the evangelical ideal, [pastors] need to accompany with 
mercy and patience the eventual stages of personal growth as these progressively 
occur. I want to remind priests that the confessional must not be a torture 
chamber but rather an encounter with the Lord’s mercy which spurs us on to 
do our best. A small step, in the midst of great human limitations, can be more 
pleasing to God than a life which appears outwardly in order but moves through 
the day without confronting great difficulties. Everyone needs to be touched by 
the comfort and attraction of God’s saving love, which is mysteriously at work in 
each person, above and beyond their faults and failings.
The emphasis is on a path of conversion, since the quintessential good news is 
the joy that God saves, even if we do not deserve salvation. And it is precisely this 
generous, freely given mercy of God that Pope Francis desires that the church 
emulates pastorally first and foremost, and therefore that the church witnesses as 
“good news” in all her ministry.
 49 Quoting Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 123. 
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In this light, even the risk of scandal as stressed by FC 84 takes on a subordinate 
role. If the “traditional” disciplinary practice of the church was ultimately out of 
charity to prevent that “the faithful … be led into error and confusion regarding 
the Church’s teaching about the indissolubility of marriage,” Pope Francis suggests 
that there could be an even greater “stumbling block” for the ecclesial community 
if she stubbornly refuses to “be merciful as the Father is merciful.” Yet, even in this 
case, Francis does not prescribe since there is no “one size fits all” solution. Rather, 
he exhorts that bishops exercise prudence for the well being of their flock.50 
I think that Pope Francis is less categorical about disciplinary measures in the 
Church - and in so doing, he retrieves the ancient practice where every bishop 
was responsible for determining disciplinary measures in his diocese - for two 
important reasons. The first is that evangelization, and therefore the ecclesial 
embodiment of God’s mercy, must always be witnessed concretely in a particular 
cultural setting. Only the bishop truly knows his flock. Thus, only the bishop can 
determine the wisest path of conversion and integration of all people of God in 
his diocese. 
The other important consideration follows, that is, of collegiality that is 
made manifest through ecclesial practices. Just as Pope Francis recently put 
the responsibility of translating liturgical texts squarely on the shoulders of 
individual Bishops’ Conferences,51 so Pope Francis expects bishops to know 
what is truly morally at stake in their diocese and to act in a prudential manner 
for their communities. 
Thus we see how, for Francis, the “personalist” ethic of Thomas must permeate 
- and be seen to permeate - every single level of pastoral reform in the church. 
As EG already suggested, “pastoral conversion” is necessary from the Roman 
Curia to the pastoral approach of individual priests in every corner of the world. 
But the heart of that pastoral conversion is a retrieval of a framework of moral 
reasoning, where the starting point is “the perspective of the acting person” who 
as he or she grows, is also perfected in their appetites to reveal through their 
actions the beauty of God’s law. 
 50 Perhaps this can be understood as similar to the Eastern Orthodox approach that while 
holding strictly to the law, they also confront difficult pastoral situations with “flexibility” 
or oikonomia. For a very enlightening discussion on these principles see Kevin Schembri, 
‘Oikonomia’, Divorce and Remarriage in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition (Edizioni Orientalia 
Christiana, 2017), Ch. 2 “Akribia and Oikonomia,” 75-124.
 51 Pope Francis, Apostolic Letter in the form of Motu Proprio Magnum Principium by which 
Can. 838 of The Code of Canon Law is Modified, September 9, 2017, https://press.vatican.va/
content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2017/09/09/170909a.html. 
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While the philosophical reflection in VS on the object of the act might seem 
to be infinitely distant from the pastoral approach of Pope Francis, in fact, it 
is its beating heart: the fulcrum to pivot the church from an “extrinsicist” and 
“technical” moral imaginary to reclaiming the grandeur of the human person 
created imago Dei as endowed with reason, will and conscience to shape his or 
her own life in pursuit of their desire for God alone. 
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